This paper outlines three versions of the intellectual: past, present and future. First, it describes an archetypal 'Parisian' myth; next, the dissolute present or 'public intellectual'; finally, a future vision based on the new concept of 'knowledge clubs'. The paper traces how 'the intellectual' has changed over time, and considers the consequences of hanging on to the past, especially by adding the word 'public' to 'intellectual'. While retaining the appearance of a character long dead, this phantasm may blind contemporary analysis as to the direction in which to look for 'public thought' in the future. It argues that the concept needs to be rethought according the approach of 'cultural science', where knowledge-agency belongs to culture-made groups not individuals. ' (1977a: 190-215), in which he contrasted speech and writing. The teacher, he argued, 'is on the side of speech', while the writer is 'every operator of language on the side of writing'. Between the two is the intellectual, defined by Barthes in his 'neutral' mode (Barthes 2005) , as 'the person who prints and publishes his speech ' (1977a: 190). Rather a bathetic definition, you may say, but it is part of a paradigmbaffling project to deconstruct the binary oppositions that make discourse meaningful. Accordingly, Barthes is not content to accept such binaries, and in the ambiguous non-place between speech and writing he inserts the intellectual. He connects 'the intellectual' not with ideas but with speech, and speech with teaching. Barthes had a
throwing projectiles at the police. Or, you might attend one of Foucault's weekly lectures at the Collège de France, which Barthes himself joined in 1977, having been nominated by Foucault (Barthes 2005) and where, just outside, he was run down by a laundry van (cleaned up by the binary-loving bourgeoisie?) while walking back from Sunday lunch with soon-to-be President François Mitterand in 1980. In the Parisian air, there's the whiff of insurrection as well as Gitanes. In the coffee crema, there's philosophy -literally, in the case of Godard's 1967 film 2 ou 3 choses que je sais d'elle/Two or Three Things I Know About Her (Ford 2013 ).
Coffee philosophy: Screen grabs of 2 ou 3 choses que je sais d'elle by J-L Godard
In such a climate, the link that Barthes makes between teachers and intellectuals is much easier to 'read', as it were. Intellectuals were hot. Foucault's Collège de France lectures were packed out, as much a part of pop culture as intellectual, not least because of the Collège's rule that such events should be free and open to the public. This kind of teaching, you might say, was not outsourced, low-value drudgery, but part of the avant-garde entertainment complex, a 'mass' medium in its own right.
You spoke, you published; you were teacher, intellectual … entertainer, celebrity … militant, hero … film-star, philosopher … it was all the same, as modelled by an amazing roll call of French teacher-intellectuals whose names still resonate (Lucy the café, to critique the present, to capture the future, to make love and life, in pursuit of what Barthes calls 'an art of living, the greatest of all the arts ' (1977a: 215) , Barthes was talking directly to them.
Despite the sectarianism that makes and mars progressive politics, and which had riven the intellectual Left after 1968 in France as elsewhere, Barthes could still claim in 1977 that 'One of the things that can be expected from a regular meeting together of speakers is quite simply goodwill ' (1977a: 213) . What optimism! What ambition! Goodwill among the many different parties, causes -and intellectuals -of 'the' Left was never secure. In this period, Left politics was gradually transforming from classbased vanguardism and militancy, agitated by parties well to the left of parliamentary socialism, towards issues-led 'new social movements', aiming (for instance) at liberating subjectivities, opposing patriarchy, colonialism, racism etc., demonstrating for (anti-nuclear) peace, environmental and social causes, or seeking new forms of personal enlightenment through sex, drugs, rock'n'roll and Eastern mysticism. Each of these movements and issues threw up its own intellectuals, few of whom were based in universities or even political parties: some were gurus, some pop stars or film stars, others were writers. Leadership in new ideas was passing from politically constituted parties to the market: radicalisation was more likely to follow from hearing John Lennon than John Maclean. 2 At this time, in Germany (Red Army Faction), Italy (Red Brigades), Britain (IRA and others), 3 and Spain (ETA), political militancy spilled over into terrorism. Some intellectuals sympathised, holding fast to the Bolshevik notion of party-and-class as The professional intellectual retreated from both class and classroom action, to take refuge in textuality and metaphor (not violence but 'violence'). But the cat was out of the bag. As Gramsci (1971) had known, everyone is an intellectual because everyone can think. Now, with 'the personal as political' and activism dispersed across the social domain, up to and including the global markets in entertainment (especially music), there was no place left for professional revolutionaries (or philosophers) any more than for 'traditional' or 'universal' intellectuals (Foucault 1977) . Now, 'the' intellectual was dispersed among myriad causes with no central leadership, 'organic' in a way that even Gramsci (1971: 9) may not have wanted to concede, because the principle of organisation, a party function, was deleted. The command and control of ideas passed from professional elites to the market (which of course had always dealt in them, out of the sight of intellectuals perhaps), and henceforth were self-organising, which also meant that they were subject to trends, crazes, marketing, branding, investment, the vagaries of consumer taste and manipulation by vested interests. But still, ideas could spring from anywhere, and gain adherents from anyone. 'The intellectual' could not operate without mediation, and the 'mass media' were by now an ascendant force in society, with their own rules and routines. The system of mass media (public and commercial entertainment and information across print, broadcast, cinema, music media) was the only one capable of coordinating such complex interactions, and so the claim that intellectuals could hold themselves apart as outsiders or exiles (except in Barthes' sense, as writers) was more than ever untenable. The intellectual function was marketised, mediatised and democratised.
It follows that intellectual and pop culture could no longer be separated, in practice or theory. Again, this was not new, for even in the days of Vietnam and revulsion against imperial 'Amerika' (as its own Yippies called it), the canniest European intellectuals and artists -Godard, say, or Nabokov, or Eco -were fascinated by American popular culture, the movies, the music, the cars, even as they used the sign of America to signal the end of everything their own cultures had held dear. Godard's 2 ou 3 choses had set the theme in train, back in 1967 (Ford 2013 The charisma of Paris in the 1960s and 70s remains strong -as does that of America too, when it comes to that. But as I've argued, this was just the moment when 'the' intellectual had dissolved into popular culture, the market, and the media; and when political leadership was devolving away from parties and towards autonomous groups and networks. Among those most sceptical about the function of the intellectual as outsider, or bande à part (as Godard might have put it), were these very intellectuals, Barthes (and Foucault) is it is against powers in the plural, and this is no easy combat (Barthes 1977b ).
Already we have entered the present: a world characterised by the issue-editors of this journal in their call for papers about the 'public intellectual'. For Barthes, media, networks and celebrity are already hard at work, often in the name of those 'liberating impulses'. But the duty of 'us as intellectuals' is not, as the phrase now has it, to 'speak truth to power'. Barthes knows there's no doing that, for speech is co-present with power, and he chooses to do battle with language itself: 'To speak, and, with even greater reason, to utter a discourse is not, as is too often repeated, to communicate; it is to subjugate' (Barthes 1977b) . Nevertheless, Barthes presses on with his investigations, albeit in the pre-scientific form of essays -that 'ambiguous genre in which analysis vies with writing' -knowing that intellectuals are not exempt from the powers they contest. He sees the 'true battle' for intellectuals here, in combatting powers that they themselves cannot avoid. This is the moment of the 'impossible' child: the moment when 'analysis' gives way to 'writing'. Barthes turns the writer into a latter-day Trickster (Hartley 2010) . This cheating imposter is the one who can survive within writing, which itself, as literature, keeps language unfixed: here's how you can 'disorientate the Law' (Barthes 1977a) . This is 7 Source: 'Situationist' by Espencat -Own work. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia the 'literary' intellectual, as opposed to the 'public' one who opposes power by using 'a discourse which engenders blame, hence guilt' to achieve celebrity.
Perhaps the problem lies in the word public. It changes the intellectual into something else: a fame-seeking, media-savvy academic. As a modifier of other terms, 'public'
can signify public functions where private ones might also be expected: for example, access to a place (public house, public bar, public toilets); or it can signify a public office (public hangman). A pair of Google Ngrams shows the frequency of various versions of the modifier 'public'. The first runs from the 1980s to 2007, in books in
English. Most frequent in this sample is 'public house', followed by 'public speech', with 'public intellectual' rising from nothing (about 1990) to third place, overtaking 'public toilet' and 'public bar' along the way. This shows that the 'public intellectual' is a recent coinage, trending upwards but still playing second fiddle to the pub, at least in published discourse. The second Ngram, at greater scale and over a much longer timeframe, runs from 1800 to 2000, shows how 'public domain' overtakes 'public house' in the nineteenth century, while the much more recent 'public sphere' (which has replaced the older and more neutral 'public affairs' -not shown here), far outstrips 'public intellectual'. How might one explain the recent growth of the term 'public intellectual' and 'public sphere'? Their appearance in the wake of Reagan-Thatcherism is doubtless significant, at a time when deregulation, privatisation and neoliberalism were ascendant in the Western political sphere, both in policy and in rhetorical politics, provoking an opposing reaction among the defenders of public culture and institutions, from public housing, education and welfare to public service broadcasting and public culture. Since then, the term 'public' has become adversarial, a marker of left/right allegiances. Because this is politics, 'our' side of the opposition is treated as universal and self-evident, while 'theirs' is duplicitous and dangerous: in short, the knowledge involved is tribal -or 'demic', belonging to culture-made groups (Hartley & Potts 2014) .
At once, the 'public' intellectual is caught up in opposition of exactly the kind that Barthes refused. If you're 'public' then you're an opponent of 'private' -the private sector, private enterprise, privatisation. Binary opposition speaks through the 'public' intellectual, whatever they may say. So much so that a 'public good' (a neutral term from economics for 'non-rivalrous' and 'non-excludable' goods) becomes the public good (a moral economy to the scholar whose knowledge is produced for a specialist peer group only, circulated in publications that the public never see, and who plays no part in public affairs or public life. That figure, once again, is the negative polar opposite of the public intellectual. Such a view motivates one of the most important developments in scholarly communication of recent times, the drive towards Open Access, where knowledge is made public using the capabilities of digital archives and internet connectivity. The argument goes that most research is produced by scholars employed in public institutions using public funds, but published in privately owned journals that these institutions then buy back at great cost to the taxpayer. Surely such knowledge ought to be a 'public good' too? Here, we do begin to see a shift from the intellectual as moral warrior to a system-based interest in the public state of knowledge. Unfortunately, the idea that all scholars are -or should become -public intellectuals is not practical in the current adversarial climate. To be able to imagine such an extension of the intellectual function we need to rethink the whole set-up. Barthes, 1977b) Roland Barthes was on to something when he sought to 'baffle the paradigm', where meaning is made by opposing 'two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning ' (2005: 12) . This is the problem with 'public' -it cannot be uttered without 'meaning' opposition. It doesn't specify what an intellectual is or does, but recruits intellectuals to a cause of faith (troth) rather than that of making knowledge (truth). However, while refusing to be conscripted into the action brigade of those who are 'against Power', Barthes was still making a distinction between two kinds of intellectual, the fighting one and the literary one. Despite his own doughty struggles against bourgeois thought, going back to the 1950s, he clearly preferred, and indeed was, the latter, even though he 'desires the Neutral ' (2005: 12) .
But that doesn't help us to find what 'outplays' (the word he uses is 'déjoue': outsmarts, thwarts, foils, outwits) the oppositional paradigm. Perhaps the problem lies in the word intellectual. Whether public or private, literary or militant, Paris or publicity, the problem is that it refers to a person, an individual, and therefore to a character, subject, identity, persona etc., which doesn't necessarily help us to analyse the production and distribution of critical and literate thinking in the digital age, for which we may need to get away from 'intellectuals' altogether, so long as they persist as ghosts in the machine, posing as humans. Only then can we move towards what Barthes wanted for his analytical work: to 'inscribe' it 'within the field of science' (1977b).
Clues, directing us to the path we should have been taking to get there, can be retrieved from the preceding sections of this (pre-scientific) essay. First, we need to abandon humanist individualism. Second, we need to abandon the public/private (or any other) opposition. And third, we need to get out of Paris.
Instead of using 'intellectuals' at all, my own preferred term is 'public thought' (Hartley 2012: chapter 4) . 11 The reason is that thought is produced, exchanged and diffused in systems, where the concept of speaker, writer, teacher, intellectual, even 'person' as the cause, originator or author of ideas is barely relevant. As soon as we turn to the global internet and digital media, we find that public thought has escaped confinement to the human individual. Furthermore, the internet is not structured in oppositions, nor does it respect previous hierarchies of prestige or authority. Public thought can come from anywhere, originated by anyone. Some ideas come from celebrities at the head of the Andersonian long tail, but myriad more are made at the tail, any of which (and according to the mathematics of probability, not the politics of opposition and exclusion) can trade places with the head and become celebrated.
So far, so good. We've left the public/private opposition behind, for the internet is made of private (proprietary) platforms in which expression of thought is public (albeit constrained by and generative of new political differences based on digital divides, IP rights, privacy/surveillance and the like). We've left Paris behind (although, because it is 'liked' by so many, its traces are all over the internet, which is always just a few clicks away from nostalgia). We've left the 'metaphysics of presence' behind too, for agency here is systemic and distributed, such that 'thought' is no longer a function of persons but a humanmachine hybrid, readily detached from one 'owner' or context and transferred to myriad others, where its productivity may be greater but unpredicted by the originator. And we've put in place instead a model of a large array of complex systems, in which scale and dynamism, regularities and turbulence, clash and conflict as well as collaboration and cooperation, demand a mode of analysis unlike that of literate critique by individual intellectuals, and more akin to the science of meteorology, i.e. probability, where forecasts rather than linear predictions are possible, using immense numbers of data-points and constantly modified computational models. But we're not there yet, for the internet is not a uniform space. In other words, it's not an open 'public sphere', where public thought can be universally created and accessed; or where new ideas enlighten the system from one end to the other without let or hindrance. This means, while we're on the subject, that calls for Open Access of knowledge, welcome as they are, only go so far, because this model is still operating the private/public binary. Its proponents want scholarly knowledge to come out from behind publishers' IP, DRM, paywalls and other mechanisms for creating artificial scarcity, that is, to be converted from private goods to public goods, available to all.
But market forces still apply, and 'private' intellectual work does not enter a smooth 'public' universe but one that is already lumpy. 12 Incumbent players seek to maintain their position by capturing public thought as it shifts from analogue to digital mode.
Clumps include former news-media mastheads (Guardian for thought; Daily Mail for celebrities); born-digital sites devoted to creating an 'invisible college' among the digerati (The Edge); and hybrid forms like TED Talks and airport bestsellers. As has been widely noted, professional expertise gives way to crowd-sourced, socially networked production and distribution of ideas. The logic of the system shifts from the authority of the author to the spreadability of the idea and its uptake among users (Jenkins et al., 2013 Instead of continuing with the distinction between public and private goods, we have begun to organise our approach around 'club' goods (Buchanan 1965) and 'common goods' (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom & Hess 2007) . This is not the place for a detailed exposition of a nascent research program, but we think it points to a much more robust model of how innovations and 'newness' -new ideas -are produced, and how they are distributed and taken up in the overall process of knowledge-growth, which itself underlies economic growth and cultural improvement alike. We are developing the concepts of 'knowledge clubs' and 'knowledge commons', deriving them from our attempt to identify a cultural science based on naturalistic, evolutionary and complexity principles, to arrive at a new understanding of communication and culture. This is probably not quite the science that Barthes dreamed of, but that's really the point: in the 1970s the evolutionary and complexity sciences were not where they are now, and the effort to link critical humanities with them was hampered by opposition to evolutionary theory ('social Darwinism').
While the sciences have made amazing progress since the 1970s, in the humanities we're still reading essays from Paris. If we are to understand how ideas are made, by what kinds of agency, and how they are distributed across whole populations to effect changes at system level, then we're going to have to have another go at science. This is not just a matter of gaining the numeracy to be able to deal with the big data generated by the internet, social networks and digital media. More important is the problem of how to establish and trace causal sequence in such a complex and variable object of study as knowledge, and of how to constitute a field where new work adds to what has been achieved in a systematic way, rather than vying for adherents based on ideological affiliation.
How, in short, can we achieve 'Neutral' status for intellectual inquiry about public thought itself? Hartley and Potts (2014) attempt a first-approximation answer to that question by linking culture with the economics of discovery and innovation, seeking to understand the role that culture plays in the growth of knowledge. The conclusion we come to is that culture makes groups; groups make knowledge; and the way in which knowledge is constituted bears all the traces of that process across the span of human history. However, successive adoptions of new communications technologies -speech, writing, print, electronic and internet -have enabled quantum leaps in the growth of knowledge, generating successive economic epochs: hunter-gatherer, agricultural, industrial, information and creative.
All along, groups are the key to both culture and knowledge. Cooperative and competitive groups of non-kin are our species' unique survival mechanism (Pagel 2012) . They are constituted and bound together in language, culture, shared codes, know-how, technology and sociality -fictions, as Harari (2014) calls them, including religion, nation, the law, money, firms. They are differentiated from and hostile to competing groups, a stance that is signalled by incommensurable languages and knowledge systems, such that 'our' knowledge is trusted but 'theirs' isn't. It follows that knowledge, meaningfulness and new ideas (innovation) are the products of groups, which also determine individuality and thus 'personae' (of the kind that David Marshall studies) within their bounds (culture). The fact that individuals these days have access to unprecedented numbers of groups -not only family, languagecommunity and ethno-territorial descent but also groups affiliated by taste, affinity and difference -means that identity itself is due for a rethink. This work is well under way of course: e.g. (among many) Tama Leaver's project on 'the ends of identity'; 13 Eleanor Sandry's on robots and communication (2015); more widely, the work of Zizi Papacharissi, Nancy Baym, Alice Marwick, Kate Crawford and others (Hartley, Burgess & Bruns 2013) .
If the individual is not the source of action and choice but the product of systems and connections, this suggests that newness, innovation and the growth of knowledge need to be looked for in the actions and interactions of groups, not only in the motivations, talents and achievements of individuals. Naturally, talented, specialist, expert individuals are vital to the production of 'newness', but it's the system that decides on value: you get the Nobel Prize because the group recognises the merit of your work, not for your merit as such (as many non-winners will attest!).
Here is where the new concept of 'knowledge clubs' comes in; where knowledge is 'non-rivalrous' but 'excludable'. People form clubs for a purpose. Some clubs are organised for the purpose of growing knowledge and ideas. They retain the characteristics of culture: common language, adversarial competitiveness with external clubs, producing not just neutral or inert information but culture-made asymmetries of trust (with various tests and punishments to ensure group coherence), and reluctance to share 'our' knowledge with 'them'. They are also apt to resort to a discursive version of the traditional solution to the problem of how to scale up and consolidate knowledge across multiple demes or groups -namely, conquest and the forcible assimilation of other groups' demic knowledge. The same model can be observed in corporate take-overs; and even in the take-over of academic disciplines from the arts/humanities to the sciences -as has happened successively to economics, psychology, geography … but not, yet, to culture.
But now global connectivity and the potential for species-wide social networks offers new possibilities for group-formation based on affinity as well as adversarial opposition. Here, we think a powerful explanatory concept is the other term from the economics of goods that has not yet been taken up, that of the knowledge commons (Ostrom; Ostrom & Hess) , and more recently the idea of an 'innovation commons' (Potts 2012) . We think that the drive towards Open Access and 'public intellectuals' alike needs to be augmented by urgent attention to how knowledge clubs and commons form and interact. With that will come a new perspective on the intellectual.
Our guess is that such a figure will turn out to be a group, or rather a cluster of interacting groups, part human and part technological-media network. We don't think it will be an oppositional figure. It might be entrepreneurial. It might play a regulatory role in system self-correction processes. 'Public thought' is in experimental development in many different group-enterprises, from research groups and advocacy/activist groups to firms (large and small) and systems (small-world networks and planetary social networks).
The task at hand is not to pine for the individualism of the intellectual, Parisian or public, nor to fall for opposition as the purpose of the knowledge agent, but to identify where and how new ideas are propagated, and what mechanisms are in place to encourage the development of a 'club' and 'commons' approach to knowledge, one that encourages the formation of new knowledge clubs while sharing knowledge gains. We need also to identify the 'critical' functions of self-organisation, selfregulation and self-correction in groups, looking to system-automation (autopoiesis)
for the organisational principle that Negri assigned to the command-and-control Party.
Public intellectuals have not proven effective agents for these functions. Meanwhile the scientific, publicity and political 'spheres' have drifted further apart, mutually repelled by low-trust adversarial out-group hostility. Instead of reproducing such oppositions unwittingly, the intellectual function of large-scale social networks needs to get clubby.
